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Article 4

Assisted Suicide: The Moral Equation
by
Richard M. Doerflinger

The author is the Associate Director, Secretariat for Pro-Life A ctivities, National
Conference of Catholic Bishops.
One day many years ago, a young idealistic doctor in a small mining town
came face to face with unexpected disaster. The local mine had collapsed,
trapping some miners for hours before rescue teams could reach them. As the
doctor walked among the mangled victims of the disaster, wondering how he
could help, one of the miners who was in excruciating pain grabbed his white
jacket and screamed: "Doctor, I beg you, let me go quickly! I can't stand it! You
can't do anything for me - it's too late. Doctor, I want to die - do you hear me?
- I want to die!"
The poor doctor had to force the man's fingers apart to loosen his grip from the
cloth of his jacket. Finally the man expired, leaving the young doctor pale and
shaken.
In a recent issue of the New England Journal of Medicine, highly respected
physicians cited emotional stories very much like this one - and without very
much reasoned analysis, assumed that assisted suicide is our only answer to such
patients and then started working out the ground rules.I
In doing so, they have skipped a most important step. The question is not
whether we should have compassion for the suffering of patients who seem to be
beyond the help of modern medicine. The question is how to channel that
compassion into actions that will truly be constructive and not destructive of
patients, physicians and society as a whole.
We know what happened to the young doctor in the mining town. He became
convinced that compassion did require abandoning the old Hippocratic
injunction against killing one's patient. Finally that doctor, one Karl Brandt by
name, agreed to begin a program of euthanasia for the incurably ill at the request
of the chancellor of Germany, one Adolf Hitler. 2
In citing this bit of history, I am acutely aware that one should not make facile
or irresponsible analogies between Nazi Germany and our present time. And it
goes without saying that the people who now propose euthanasia are not any
kind of Nazis. Nor, for that matter, was the young Dr. Brandt at the time of his
mining disaster.
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And yet, even as we recoil in horror at everything that has to do with the Nazis,
we should also keep our eyes open so as not to repeat some mistakes of the past.
We - the NEJM authors and the rest of us - are very much in the position of
the young Karl Brandt, who looked upon the apparently meaningless suffering of
dying patients and wondered whether once - just once - it might be all right to
bend law and morality to put a few suffering humans out oftheir misery. Andjust
like Dr. Brandt, in his closing statement to the Nuremberg tribunal, we want to
insist that our only motive is "pity for the incurable."
In Germany, once people were used to the basic idea of euthanasia, the
program expanded to the mentally ill, the retarded, and then to people in certain
social, political or racial categories. But as Robert Jay Lifton has written in his
book The Nazi Doctors, it all started with one important change in morality and
law: "At the heart of the Nazi enterprise," he wrote, "is the destruction of the
boundary between healing and killing."3
In the progressive corruption of the German euthanasia program, one event in
1940 stands out. The program to end the lives of the incurably ill had been going
on under Dr. Brandt's direction for nine months, and a Nazi official suggested
that it was time to begin selecting candidates based on their ability to work. Dr.
Brandt, who still thought of the program as a humanitarian one, strongly objected
to this rating of lives by their social worth to others - but he was overruled. He
found he no longer had any compelling arguments as to why this shift in policy
should not be made. 4 He himself had already crossed the truly important
boundary - the one between healing and killing.
Today, too, the compassion that leads many of us to consider euthanasia is
mixed with less noble motives. We are tempted to see severely debilitated
patients as less than fully human, as less than fully alive - some of us even use
dehumanizing language, like "vegetable" or "gomer" or "gork," to describe
them. We are uncomfortable with patients who need care but cannot be cured
-the disabled, the senile, the persons with AIDS. Our young doctors
increasingly do not want to have to care for certain kinds of patients - out of
fear, prejudice, or just a feeling of helplessness and frustration, they want them to
just go away. In one recent study published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association, 23% of American medical residents said they "would not
care for persons with AIDS if they had a choice. "5 In another recent survey, in the
Journal ofAIDS, exactly the same percentage of physicians in San Francisco 23%- said they would probably comply with an AIDS patient's initial request
for assistance in suicide, even though it is illegal and such action would allow for
no waiting period so the patient could think over the matter more carefully. This
second study found that actual requests for suicide assistance by patients were
"surprisingly low," and the number of requests a physician had actually received
did not affect how willing he or she was to give such assistance. The most
important factor determining how he or she responded to the question was that
physician s personal belief in the ethical rightness of euthanasia for certain kinds
of patients. 6
I do not cite these realities to criticize medical professionals. But before buying
into an agenda that is being sold on the basis of a naive sentimentalism about the
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gentle death, we need to look unflinchingly at human nature and human
motivations and ask whether the power to kill is something we are prepared to
handle. If the answer is "no," it is not because doctors are unusually venal or
unethical - it is because, like all the rest of us, they are only human.
Our investigation should include an appreciation of certain facts.
First, we should appreciate that the real issue here is not personal freedom. If it
were, we would have no business saying that anyone, sick or healthy, should be
prevented from committing suicide. We would have to say that only the
individual can decide whether his or her own situation merits death - for that is
exactly what autonomy means, making the rules for oneself. And yet few people
who support assisted suicide favor such an unlimited right. As Professor John
Conley of Fordham University has observed: "Supporters of active euthanasia
are oddly inconsistent. Their insistence on the right of the terminally ill to kill
themselves rarely includes the right to suicide in general. Radical autonomy is
valued only in the specific area of terminal illness or severe disability. Few
editorials celebrate the right of teenagers to kill themselves after a failed romance,
of CEO's to destroy themselves after a bankruptcy, or of politicians to be
euthanized after corruption is revealed ... . Rather than resting, upon neutral
medical facts, the new enthusiasm for the suicide of the severely ill reflects the
growing disvalue placed upon the ill in our society. While we call out the posse to
save nephew Frank on the ledge after he broke up with Sue, we are delighted at
Granny's decision to gracefully exit the nursing home thanks to the 'mercitron'
and sympathetic laws."7
This double standard is not even based on any special agitation by the
particular classes of people targeted for suicide assistance. For example, elderly
voters rejected California's euthanasia initiative by a far higher margin than
younger voters did,s and terminally ill patients have a suicide rate not markedly
different from that of other adults. 9 Their suicide rate is slightly higher than that of
the general public, but then so is that of physicians.
A second fact to appreciate: While the class of patients affected by the
euthanasia agenda does not include everyone, it is not confined, and cannot be
confined, to the terminally ill. It would make little sense to confine it that way. It
is true that the terminally ill will "die anyway," even if we don't kill them - but
that is true of everyone. We will all "die anyway." And if ending a short life of
suffering were good, surely ending a long life of suffering would be better. In fact
none of the major players in the current policy debate want to restrict euthanasia
to terminal cases. Most of Jack Kevorkian's clients have had no terminal illness,
except by his own definition that "every serious illness is terminal."l0 The
Hemlock Society points with approval to the Netherlands, where assisted suicide
has already moved beyond dying patients to the disabled and elderly. This past
year, Derek Humphry announced that a great many Hemlock members want to
move the American debate to the next logical stage, in which all elderly citizens
will be encouraged to discuss the circumstances in which they want help
committing suicide. I I Recently he described his own book Final Exit as a
"workshop manual" for anyone needing assistance in suicide "in the cases of
terminal illness, terminal old age, or quadriplegia."12 And the Washington and
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California initiatives offered in recent years by Hemlock and its allies include
vague definitions of "terminal illness" that could be construed to include
disabilities that are not "terminal" in any ordinary sense of the word. Once the
law covered any kind of disability, of course, it might take just one lawsuit under
the Americans with Disabilities Act to ensure that all disabled people receive
equal protection for their right to assisted suicide. Such expansion is not a slippery
slope; it is the present agenda of those proposing laws on this subject.
A third fact: We should admit that anticipated benefit to ourselves and society,
not to the individual patient, is often the primary reason why we are tempted to
allow euthanasia and assisted suicide. This is most explicit in recent statements by
our euthanasia pioneer, Jack Kevorkian. In one recent interview in the magazine
Free Inquiry, he was asked whether euthanasia is morally right because it relieves
a patient's suffering and the suffering of the family. He said these are "minor
benefits" that "do not counter-balance the loss of a human life. But if the patient
opts for euthanasia, or if someone is to be executed, and at the same time opts to
donate organs, he or she can save anywhere from five to ten lives. Now the death
becomes definitely, incalculably positive."'3 In short, these patients with
meaningless lives should be helped to die because they're wasting organs that
others with useful lives have a need for.
Even when we are not talking about something as crass as terminating people
to get their organs, we often cast an eye toward fiscal bottom line and the
burdens and pressures that sick people place on the rest of us. Again, as Professor
Conley noted, if the intensity of the individual's own suffering were the
determining factor, we would not be talking only about helping the sick and
disabled to die. From the individual's own subjective point of view, the source of
his or her suffering is not particularly relevant. We are talking about the sick
because they place the greatest demands on us.
If this issue is not about personal autonomy, or any factor peculiar to terminal
illness, or the relief of the patient's own suffering, what is the issue? It is whether
actively inducing death is a morally responsible solution to social and individual
problems generally. If we are considering only helping the sick to commit suicide,
while continuing to prevent suicide for everyone else, the issue is whether human
life has inherent value and dignity - as the authors of our Declaration of
Independence believed - or loses that value and dignity in cases of illness and
dependency. If the answer is yes, then we seem to have endorsed the key concept
that allowed Dr. Brandt and his colleagues to move toward gross violations of
human rights - the concept of"lebensunwertes Leben," or life unworthy oflife.
And then the slope is slippery indeed.
I think we must continue to value all human life - not in the sense that we
must always do everything possible to prolong it regardless of the circumstances,
but in the sense that we must never actively destroy life and must always treat it
with respect. And we must do this even - or especially - in life's final and most
vulnerable moments.
Why should we do so? From a religious viewpoint the answer is clear enough:
Life is our first and most precious gift from a loving God, over which we are
called to exercise stewardship but not absolute dominion. Responsible
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25

stewardship - especially on the part of physicians - calls us to use our
knowledge and skills in reverent humility, recognizing our own finitude and the
incompleteness of our wisdom. It means we cannot claim an absolute mandate to
prolong life, as though we could actually defeat death by our own puny mortal
efforts; but it also means we must never arrogate to ourselves the authority to take
life, as though we were its lords and masters. To do either of those things would
be to "play God" in the pejorative sense.
The vision of life as a gift of the Creator is shared by Catholics, Protestants,
Jews and many others, and is reflected in the founding documents of our nation.
But I understand that it is not shared by all. To those who find it unappealing I
would say this: If life is not a divine gift, it is at least the most basic and
fundamental of the human goods which societies like ours are established to
;rotect. And it is precisely an ethical devotion to this good that makes the
physician a member of a profession, rather than just another technician with a
good-paying job. Life is basic because it is the pre-condition for every other
human good and human right, even freedom. You cannot enhance someone's
freedom by taking his life, because corpses have no freedom. Freely taking your
life, like freely selling yourself into slavery, is the ultimate self-contradiction of
freedom, not its ultimate triumph.
In fact, if we devalue the lives of the seriously ill we will end up asking
ourselves why the freedom of their request is so important. This is because life is
not just another good - it is the bodily reality of an individual human person.
And a human person oflittle value will surely have freedom that is oflittle value.
Thus do the assumptions behind voluntary euthanasia pave the way for
involuntary euthanasia.
Some have asked, "Whose life is it anyway?" My own answer is: "It is God's
first of all, and it is mine in trust to respect and care for." But if my answer is
wrong, then the only other answer that makes sense is: "It doesn't belong to
anyone, not even to me. My life is me, not just another piece of property that I
own. That is why I can't ethically sell myself into slavery or prostitution or a life
of drug addiction - because my life is not just a possession, even to me. And to
treat certain kinds of human life as disposable property will be to treat particular
classes of people as disposable property."
Devaluing the life of the sick is not only dangerous - it is also unnecessary for
those of us who truly wish to show compassion for the dying. If some patients
now die in inhumane, painful and undignified ways, we should not assume that
the way to give them a "dignified, painless and humane" death is to have their
doctors kill them or help them kill themselves. Why not address this pain, this
inhumanity, and these indignities, instead of encouraging the patient to get rid of
himself? Euthanasia doesn't solve these problems - it just removes one patient
from the environment where the problems will keep arising and increasingly be
taken for granted. After all - we will be tempted to say - if you don't like the
undignified way we care for the dying, you can always opt to kill yourself.
That would be a cop-out of the most inexcusable sort. Of course there are other
and better solutions to the problems dying patients often face - problems like
pain, loneliness, and the feeling that one has lost control over one's life. Those
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solutions can be summed up in the phrase "comprehensive palliative care" - the
kind of care the hospice movement embodies and promotes. Certainly the
avenues for improving this approach have not been exhausted, leaving us only
with euthanasia - on the contrary, those avenues are just beginning to be opened
up as they should.
Proposals for euthanasia and assisted suicide are insidious because they assume
there are no real alternatives to suicide for dying patients - and they will ensure
that we never have any. While leaving intact the existing laws against assisting
suicide for everyone else, they will separate out a class of citizens for whom
suicide is accepted and even to be expected. And at a time when loneliness and
alienation are perhaps the most serious problem dying patients face, acceptance
of euthanasia will aggravate their loneliness. For it is only human nature that
many physicians feel uncomfortable spending time with dying patients because they don't want to get too attached to someone who they know will die
soon. How much more cold and distant and impersonal will doctors become
when they have to see every dying patient as someone they may be asked to help
kill soon? And how much more pressure will that alienation place on the patients
themselves to opt for that final exit?
No, we should not be fooled by the myth of neutrality - the myth that by
approving euthanasia we will merely be adding to people's free choices. By
approving the choice of a physician-assisted death, society would undermine
people's ability to make any choice other than suicide. We therefore have to
make our own choice as a society: to encourage the sick and elderly to make an
early exit, to spare the rest of us the burden of caring for them - or to commit
ourselves to help dying people to live as well as they can, for as long as they are
with us. That second choice is the harder one to follow through on - but for that
very reason, it's not something we can do at all, let alone do well, if we're
half-hearted about it, if we spend our lives debating whether these people's lives
are worth caring for at all.
They are worth caring for. And that means we ha ve a lot of work to do. I think
we should get to work.
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